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Pity the applied mathematician. Not only does she have to suffer the perennial people-repelling 
problem which all mathematicians have experienced at parties, but in addition she faces a 
general ignorance of the importance of mathematics in understanding the natural world and 
developing new technologies. I told a guest at a recent party that I use mathematics to try to 
understand migraines; she thought I meant that I ask migraine sufferers to do mental arithmetic 
to alleviate their pain. What does such a misconception reveal? There is the surface fact of a 
continuing need to publicly discuss the work of mathematicians. But at a deeper level, this 
response reveals a stunning fact we often overlook: the world can be understood 
mathematically. Moreover, the misconception reminds us that this fact is not obvious. I want to 
discuss the question of the applicability of mathematics to an understanding of the world. To do 
so requires reviewing the long history of the general philosophy of mathematics - what I will 
loosely here call “metamath” - before discussing our Big Question: “why can math be used to 
describe the world?”, or to extend it more provocatively, “why is applied math even possible?” 
 
Before we go any further, we should be clear on what we mean by applied mathematics. I will 
borrow a definition given by an important applied mathematician of the 20th and 21st centuries, 
Tim Pedley, the GI Taylor Professor of Fluid Mechanics at the University of Cambridge. In his 
Presidential Address to the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications in 2004, he said 
“Applying mathematics means using a mathematical technique to derive an answer to a 
question posed from outside mathematics.” This definition is deliberately broad - including 
everything from counting change to climate change - and the very possibility of such breadth of 
definition is part of the mystery we are discussing. 
 
Pedley’s definition reaffirms what the phrase “applied mathematics” tells us of its subject: it is 
mathematics which is applied. As such, the question of the applicability of mathematics is 
arguably more important than the questions typically addressed in metamath for the following 
reasons. Firstly, because applied mathematics is mathematics, it raises all the same issues as 
those traditionally arising in metamath. Secondly, being applied, it raises some of the issues 
addressed in the philosophy of science. I suspect that the case could be made for our big 
question being in fact the Big Question in the philosophy of science and mathematics - and 
perhaps beyond, as we will see later. However, let us now turn to the history of metamath: what 
has been said about mathematics, its nature and its applicability? 
 
The long history of mathematics generally lacks a pure/applied distinction, yet in the “modern” 
era of mathematics over, say, the last two centuries, there has been an almost exclusive focus 
on a philosophy of pure mathematics, on metamath. In particular, emphasis has been given to 
the so-called “foundations” of mathematics - what is it that gives mathematical statements truth? 
Metamathematicians interested in foundations are commonly grouped into four camps. 
 
Formalists such as David Hilbert view mathematics as being founded on a combination of sets 
and logic, and to some extent view the process of doing mathematics as an essentially 
meaningless shuffling of symbols according to certain prescribed rules. Logicists see 
mathematics as being an extension of logic. The arch-logicists Bertrand Russell and Alfred 
North Whitehead famously took hundreds of pages to prove (logically) that two plus two equals 
four. Intuitionists are exemplified by LEJ Brouwer, a man about whom it has been said that “he 
wouldn’t believe that it was raining or not until he looked out of the window” (Knuth). This quote 
satirises one of the central intuitionist ideas, the rejection of the law of the excluded middle, 
which says that a statement is either true or false: intuitionists believe in the existence of neuter 
statements, which have been neither proved nor disproved. Moreover, they admit only 
enumerable operations into their proofs, since they believe that mathematics is entirely a 
product of the human mind, which they postulate to be capable of grasping infinity only as an 
extension of an algorithmic or pseudo-mechanical one-two-three kind of process, of the kind we 
experience in the physical world. Finally, Platonists, members of the oldest of the four camps, 
believe in an independent reality or existence of numbers and the other objects of mathematics. 
For a platonist such as Kurt Godel, mathematics exists without the human mind, possibly 
without the physical universe, but there is a mysterious link between the mental world of 
humans and the platonic realm of mathematics. 
 
No undisputed answer has been given to which of these four alternatives - if any - serves as the 
foundations of mathematics. While it might seem like such rarefied discussions have nothing to 
do with the question of applicability, it has even been argued that this uncertainty over 
foundations has influenced the very practice of applying mathematics. In “The loss of certainty”, 
Morris Kline wrote in 1980 that “The crises and conflicts over what sound mathematics is have 
also discouraged the application of mathematical methodology to many areas of our culture 
such as philosophy, political science, ethics, and aesthetics . . . The Age of Reason is gone.” 
Thankfully, mathematics is now beginning to be applied to these areas, but we have learned the 
important historical lesson that there is to the choice of applications of mathematics a 
sociological dimension sensitive to metamathematical problems.  
 
However, the logical next step for the metamathematician who bothers to think about the 
applicability of mathematics, would be to ask what each of the four foundational views has to 
say about our big question. Accessible discussions along this line have been written by a 
number of mathematicians and scientists, such as Roger Penrose in the book “The Road to 
Reality”, or Paul Davies in his book “The Mind of God”. 
 
I would like to take a different path here by reversing the “logical” next step: I want to ask “what 
does the applicability of mathematics have to say about the foundations of mathematics?” In 
asking this question I take for granted that there is no serious disagreement about whether 
mathematics is applicable: the entire edifice of modern science and technology, depending 
heavily as it does on the mathematization of nature, bears witness to this fact. 
 
But what can a formalist say to explain the applicability of mathematics? If mathematics really is 
nothing other than the shuffling of mathematical symbols in the world’s longest running and 
most multiplayer game, then why should it describe the world? What privileges the game of 
math to describe the world rather than any other game? Remember,  the formalist must answer 
from within the formalist worldview, so no Plato-like appeals to a deeper meaning of math or 
hidden connection to the physical world is allowed. For similar reasons, the logicists are left 
floundering, for if they say “well, perhaps the universe is an embodiment of logic” then they are 
tacitly assuming the existence of a Platonic realm of logic which can then be (but need not 
necessarily be) embodied. Thus for both formalists and logicists the very existence of applicable 
mathematics poses a problem apparently fatal to their position. 
 
Neither logicism nor formalism is widely “believed” any more, despite the cliche that 
mathematicians are platonists during the week and formalists at the weekend. Both 
perspectives fell out of favour for reasons other than the potentially fatal one about the 
applicability of mathematics, reasons largely connected with the work of Godel, Skolem, and 
others. But the third proposed “foundation”, intuitionism, never really garnered much support in 
the first place. To this day, it is muttered about in dark tones by most working mathematicians, if 
it is considered at all. What is seen as a highly restricted toolkit for proofs and a bizarre notion of 
limbo in which a statement is neither true nor false until a proof has been constructed one way 
or the other, lower the attraction of this viewpoint to most mathematicians. However, the central 
idea of the enumerable nature of processes in the universe and certainly as it is perceived by 
the human mind, appears to be deduced from reality. In this way, perhaps intuitionism is derived 
from reality, from the apparently at-most-countably infinite physical world. It appears that 
intuitionism offers a neat answer to the question of the applicability of mathematics: it is 
applicable because it is derived from the world. 
 
However, this answer may fall apart on closer inspection. For a start, there is much in modern 
mathematical physics which requires notions of infinity beyond the enumerable, and therefore 
possibly forever beyond the explicatory power of intuitionistic mathematics. Even one of the 
modern ideas which could benefit from the finitist logic of the inuitionists fails to be truly 
intuitionistic and seems to sneak in some platonic ideas. Thus the “digital physics” community, 
whose motto is Ed Fredkin’s “It from Bit”, involves the “bit” of information theory, seemingly 
positing a platonic existence to information from which the physical world is derived. But more 
fundamentally, intuitionism has no answer to the question of why non-intuitionistic mathematics 
is applicable. It may well be that a non-intuitionistic mathematical theorem is only applicable to 
the natural world when an intuitionistic proof of the same theorem also exists, but this has not 
been established. Moreover, it is not clear that the objects of the human mind need faithfully 
represent the objects of the physical universe. Mental representations have been selected for 
over evolutionary time not for their fidelity but for the advantage they gave our forebears in their 
struggles to survive and to mate. 
 
Formalism and logicism have failed to answer our big question. The jury is out on whether 
inuitionism might do so, but huge conceptual difficulties remain. What, then, of Platonism? 
 
The platonist believes that the physical world is an imperfect shadow of a realm of mathematical 
objects (and possibly of notions like “truth” and “beauty” as well). The physical world emerges, 
somehow, from this platonic realm, is rooted in it, and therefore objects and relationships 
between objects in the world shadow those in the platonic realm. The fact that the world is 
described by mathematics then ceases to be a mystery as it has become an axiom: the world is 
rooted in a mathematical realm. But even greater problems then arise: why should the physical 
realm emerge from and be rooted in the platonic realm? Why should the mental realm emerge 
from the physical? Why should the mental realm have any direct connection with the platonic? 
And in what way do any of these questions differ from those surrounding ancient myths of the 
emergence of the world from the slain bodies of gods or titans, the Buddha-nature of all natural 
objects, or the Abrahamic notion that we are “created in the image of God”? Indeed, the belief 
that we live in a divine universe and partake in a study of the divine mind by studying 
mathematics and science has arguably been the longest-running motivation for rational thought, 
from Pythagoras in ancient times, through Newton, “the last of the magicians”, and to many 
scientists today. “God”, in this sense, seems to be neither an object in the space-time world, nor 
the sum total of objects in that physical world, not yet an element in the Platonic world, but 
rather something closer to the entirety of the Platonic realm. In this way, many of the difficulties 
outlined above which a Platonist faces in explaining how the Platonic world is embodied by the 
physical world, accessed by the mental world, and interacts mutually with both, are identical 
with those faced by theologians of the Judeo-Christian world - and possibly of other religious or 
quasi-religious systems. 
 
So that secular icon Galileo believed that the “book of the universe” was written in the 
“language” of mathematics - a platonic statement begging an answer (if not the question) if ever 
there was one. Even non-religious mathematical scientists today regularly report feelings of awe 
and wonder at their explorations of what feels like a Platonic realm. Paul Davies goes further in 
“The Mind of God”, and highlights the two-way nature of this motivation. Not only may a 
mathematician be driven to understand mathematics in a bid to glimpse the mind of God (a non-
personal God like that of Spinoza or Einstein), but our very ability to access this “key to the 
universe” is “too intimate”, suggesting that “the existence of mind in some organism on some 
planet in the universe is surely a fact of fundamental significance . . . We are truly meant to be 
here.” 
 
In fact, a point rarely mentioned is that the hypothesis of the mathematical structure and 
physical nature of the universe, and our mental access to study both, as being somehow a part 
of and upheld by the mind, being, and body of a “god” is a considerably tidier answer to the 
questions of the foundation of mathematics and its applicability than those described above. 
Such a hypothesis, though rarely called such, has been found in a wide variety of religious, 
cultural, and scientific systems of the past several millenia. It is not natural, however, for a 
philosopher or scientist to wholeheartedly embrace such a view (even if they may wish to) since 
it tends to encourage the preservation of mystery rather than the drawing back of the obscuring 
veil. 
 
Roger Penrose has most lucidly illustrated some of this mystery with a “three-worlds” diagram. 
The platonic, physical, and mental worlds are the three in question, and he sketches them as 
spheres arranged in a triangle. A cone then connects the platonic world with the physical: in its 
most general form, the diagram shows the narrow end of the cone penetrating the platonic world 
and the wider part penetrating some of the physical world. This is to show that (at least some of) 
the physical world is embedded in at least some of the platonic world. A similar cone connects 
the physical to the mental world: (at least some of) the mental world is embedded in the physical 
world. Finally, and most mysteriously, the triangle is completed by a cone from the mental to the 
platonic world: (at least some of) the platonic world is embedded in the mental world. Each 
cone, each world, remains a mystery. 
 
We seem to have reached the rather depressing impasse in which none of the four proposed 
foundations of mathematics can cope unambiguously with the question of the applicability of 
mathematics. But I want you to finish this essay instead with the feeling that this is incredibly 
good news! The teasing out of the nuances of the Big Question - why does applied mathematics 
exist? - is a future project which could yet yield deep insight into the nature of mathematics, the 
physical universe, and our place within both systems as embodied, meaning-making, pattern-
finding systems. 
 
